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ABSTRACT. A fundamental question about a market is under what conditions, and then how rapidly,
does price signaling cause price equilibration. Qualitatively, this ought to depend on how well-
connected the market is. We address this question quantitatively for a certain class of Arrow-Debreu
markets with continuous-time proportional taˆtonnement dynamics. We show that the algebraic con-
nectivity of the market determines the effectiveness of price signaling equilibration. This also lets us
study the rate of external noise that a market can tolerate and still maintain near-equilibrium prices.
1. INTRODUCTION
In a free market, the rise or fall of a price signals excess demand or supply; if the dynamics of
price adjustment work well, signaling can enable goods to clear and prices to equilibrate. A fun-
damental question about a market is therefore under what conditions, and then how rapidly, does
price signaling cause price equilibration. It is a stubborn question however how best to model
price dynamics. A variety of both taˆtonnement (non-trading) [48] and trading processes have been
offered as models. The question has been particularly studied in the context of Arrow-Debreu
markets [32, 5]: it was shown early on that continuous-time taˆtonnement converges to an equi-
librium if goods are gross substitutes [4] but otherwise, as Scarf [40] exhibited, it may not. This
spurred the study of alternative forms of taˆtonnement [41, 31, 43, 47, 29, 23, 27, 8], which were
shown to have stronger convergence properties. Neither taˆtonnement nor existing trading models
(see below), however, are fully reductionist theories; that is, we do not have a model of individual
strategic transactions from which emerges at the market level an Arrow-Debreu market with the
stated dynamics and which equilibrates to the given endowments.
Despite this difficulty in the theory, price signaling in practice certainly works to stabilize prices. In
a typical market, over long periods, prices oscillate with mild amplitude within a near-equilibrium
zone and goods roughly clear. After any shock, the market restores itself to a possibly new near-
equilibrium zone. This is after all the rationale for studying equilibrium theories. Moreover, in
the last 15 years laboratory evidence has accumulated in support of taˆtonnement dynamics [36, 3,
26, 20, 15] even in markets such as Scarf’s or Gale’s [19] where it makes surprising predictions.
In short, there is no question but that the “invisible hand” of price signaling does operate within
free markets. A good economic theory ought to capture quantitative aspects of its operation. Such
quantification should include information about rates of convergence, at least in the vicinity of a
stable equilibrium; as well as, ideally, also information about the typical out-of-equilibrium modes
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that may empirically be observed, since modes which do not damp rapidly can be expected to
be continually present due to external stimulation. We emphasize that a true quantitative theory
cannot be one-sided (bounding the rate of convergence only from above or only from below)—if
we wish to compare two markets, or understand whether oscillations are due to stimulation or are
long-lived modes of the system, we need both upper and lower bounds.
In this paper we take a step toward such quantification. Given the already-discussed challenge of
modeling markets out of equilibrium, our approach is very conservative: we work entirely within
the Arrow-Debreu market framework, and restrict ourselves to the arguably simplest price dy-
namic, continuous-time proportional-taˆtonnement (CTPT) as in Samuelson [38]. For an overview
of this topic see [33, 35], and for experimental evidence for this particular class of dynamics in
trading markets, see [26, 15]. (It is notable that the taˆtonnement process is predictive of trad-
ing dynamics despite formally involving no trade.) We restrict ourselves to a setting where these
dynamics converge, namely, the gross substitutes regime [4] (see also [6, 45]) and, since we are
asking for rather precise results, we assume that utilities take on a predictable form; for this pur-
pose we again make the most standard assumption possible, namely that agents have CES utilities.
Furthermore, since we wish to establish both upper and lower bounds on rate of convergence, we
restrict ourselves entirely to system behaviour in a neighborhood of equilibrium. It may be pos-
sible to extend our results to the entire space of prices, but one would have to argue that this is
economically well-motivated, since the simple CTPT rule has many consistent extensions away
from equilibrium. We follow Tolstoy’s famous dictum about families but, not being novelists,
focus our attention on happy markets, which for us means, those near equilibrium.
We have, therefore, eliminated almost all parameters available to tweak the market model, except
the parameter we wish to study: the connectivity structure of the market. One expects that a
market in which all participants interact pairwise will have relatively sharp and rapid reactions to
price imbalances; whereas one in which participants have only indirect effects on most others, will
adjust more moderately and slowly. We shall quantify this phenomenon fairly precisely through
the spectrum of a Laplacian matrix that is derived from the connectivity structure of the market.
Specifically, the second eigenvalue of this matrix, also known as the algebraic connectivity of the
network, will be shown to determine, in most cases, the convergence rate of market dynamics.
If the market is continually buffeted by external noise at a fixed rate, then the convergence rate
determines in turn the typical distance of prices from equilbrium, and this too will be quantified.
More precise statement awaits the definitions in the next section.
The Laplacian, also called the heat kernel, originates in Physics (in the study of heat diffusion), in
Probability (in the study of random walk), and in Electrical Engineering (in the study of resistive
networks); in the last decades it has found wide applicability in Finance, Combinatorics and The-
oretical Computer Science. We are not, however, aware of other applications of it to the study of
structure of economic markets.
1.1. Other related work. Before moving on to our development, we mention that not all study
of market dynamics has been on non-trading processes; out-of-equilibrium trade models have also
been developed and shown to converge, such as the Edgeworth process [46] or the Hahn pro-
cess [21, 22]; however, these are less relevant to our study for several reasons, including that the
former requires coordination of large coalitions; and the latter converges to an equilibrium that
generally does not agree with the specified endowments. For more see [17]. Simply put, although
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it would be desirable to pursue our topic in a trading process, no model with all the needed prop-
erties has yet been found. Perhaps, as we focus our study in a neighborhood of equilibrium, the
distinctions between models are however not so significant.
The history of work on the stability of taˆtonnement begins with Hicks [24], who discussed the local
stability of taˆtonnement under some conditions on the market. Samuelson [38, 39] showed that the
Hicksian conditions are neither sufficient nor necessary for stability. Metzler [34] showed that the
Hicksian conditions are sufficient for stability in the case of gross substitutes utilities.
We also mention a recent line of work in theoretical computer science on taˆtonnement [13, 18, 14,
9, 12, 11, 7] and related processes [49]. These papers consider Fisher markets with CES utilities
(not necessarily gross substitutes) and also some cases beyond this class of utility functions. Fisher
markets are special-case Arrow-Debreu markets, in which the total initial endowments of goods
is split among all the participants in the same proportions for all goods. Therefore, changing the
relative prices of the goods does not change the relative purchasing power of the participants, only
their desired consumption basket. Such markets are attractive from a computational perspective, as
there are efficient algorithms to compute equilibrium prices and allocations. The above-mentioned
papers propose several discrete time interpretations of CTPT, and establish global upper bounds
on the convergence time of discrete-time taˆtonnement. The highlight of this line of work from
our perspective is the paper [11] that relates discrete-time taˆtonnement to the convex optimization
method of gradient descent, and upper bounds the convergence time across the CES spectrum
(including the complementary case of ρ < 0). The results in these papers are quite incomparable
with ours. On the positive side, the results hold for a wider range of utility functions and apply
to the entire space of prices, not only near equilibrium. On the negative side, the results apply
only to Fisher markets; and the most essential distinction is that these works do not address our
main question of quantifying the rate of convergence in terms of the market structure—in fact
their framework does not consider the market structure at all, and they only provide worst-case
one-sided (upper) bounds on the convergence time.
In a different vein, researchers have been interested in other market structure effects: as these works
do not directly impact ours, we do not attempt a survey, but only provide a few pointers: [30] looks
at markets in which buyer-seller pairs can trade only along established links, at the incentives to
form such links, and at the efficiency of trade in such networks; [28] considers Arrow-Debreu
markets in which, again, direct trade can occur only along established links, thus enabling the
same commodity to have different prices in different places; and [10] looks at markets in which
buyer-seller pairs can only interact through intermediary traders, and studies the power of these
traders and how equilibrium prices are affected by the connectivity structure.
2. THE MODEL
We consider an Arrow-Debreu market in which each participant i is endowed with a quantity
si > 0 of a unique perfectly divisible good, also denoted by i. There are n ≥ 2 participants, and
participant i values an allocation xij of the goods j according to a CES utility function:
ui(x) =
(∑
j
(cijxij)
ρ
)1/ρ
The parameter ρ is shared by all and is in the gross substitutes regime, ρ ∈ (0, 1). Simply by
rescaling units, we may suppose that all supplies si = 1; this entails replacing any cij in the
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original market by cijsj in the rescaled market. The coefficients cij can vary widely but cannot be
entirely general; they must satisfy the following three conditions. (a) Nonnegativity: cij ≥ 0. (b)
Connectedness of the market: for every i, j there are i = i0, i1, . . . , ik = j s.t.
∏k
`=1 ci`−1i` > 0.
(c) Circulation-free: let i0, i1, . . . , ik = i0 be any cycle through the vertices. Then
∏k
`=1 ci`−1i` =∏k
`=1 ci`i`−1 . (Observe that these conditions are not affected by the rescaling of the supplies.)
It is a consequence of (b) and (c) that the coefficients are weakly undirected in the sense that
cij = 0 if and only if cji = 0. Consequently, it will be useful to conceive of the participants as
vertices of a graph, with i, j connected by an undirected edge if cij > 0. There may be self-loops
in this graph. Let Cij = cδij . Let U be the adjacency matrix of this graph (the “unweighted” market
graph), defined by Uij = 1 if Cij > 0, Uij = 0 if Cij = 0.
It will simplify expressions to replace the customary parameter ρ by δ = ρ/(1 − ρ) (note that
1/(1−ρ) is the elasticity of substitution, indicating the extent that desired goods serve as substitutes
for each other). In all theorems in this paper, δ is an arbitrary value in (0,∞); this corresponds to
ρ being an arbitrary value in (0, 1).
In the Arrow-Debreu model, at prices pi, not all 0, participant i has budget bi = pi, which is then
allocated to goods j so as to optimize basket utility; this results in the following demand by i for j:
(2.1) dij(p) =
piCij
p1+δj
∑
k Cik/p
δ
k
(the argument p will generally be understood and we will abbreviate to dij). Observe that these
demands are invariant under rescaling the coefficients Cij by any positive multipliers αi. The
dynamics (to be described in Section 3) depend only on the demands and supplies, so we from
now on rescale the Cij such that for every i, minj:Cij>0Cij = 1 (and of course some Cij > 0). This
rescaling, too, preserves the conditions (a,b,c).
In summary, for any given δ the market is fully specified by the data C.
We let P be the following function of prices p: Pi(p) =
∑
k
Cik
pδk
. So dij =
piCij
p1+δj Pi(p)
.
Let dj =
∑
i dij denote the total demand for good j. Prices are in equilibrium if dj = 1 for all j.
Throughout the paper we use r to denote a vector of equilibrium prices, andRi = Pi(r) =
∑
k
Cik
rδk
;
then the equilibrium condition can be rewritten as the following system of equations:
(2.2) 1 =
1
r1+δj
∑
i
riCij
Ri
with
dij(r) =
1
r1+δj
riCij
Ri
being the equilibrium demand by i for j.
3. THE DYNAMICS AND OUR RESULTS
In the subsequent Section 4 we justify existence, uniqueness, and certain properties of the equilib-
rium vector of prices, denoted r. The focus of the paper is dynamics in a neighborhood of r; we
now describe those dynamics and our results.
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3.1. Dynamics. As indicated earlier, the dynamics are proportional taˆtonnement in continuous
time, specifically, for a price vector p,
(3.1) p˙j = (dj − 1)pj
and we study these dynamics in a perturbation of equilibrium, pj = rjeαj for small α. Then
(3.2) α˙j =
p˙j
pj
If cj is a function of 1 ≤ j ≤ n, |c〉 or |cj〉 ∈ Rn denotes a column vector with j’th entry cj; if
c is a scalar, |c〉 ∈ Rn denotes a column vector with all entries c. At equilibrium, by definition,
p˙ = |0〉, so, referring to the dynamics of Eq. (3.2), we have α˙ = |0〉 at α = |0〉. Consequently
α˙j =
∑
i
∂dj
∂αi
∣∣∣∣
|0〉
· αi
From now on we abbreviate Dji =
∂dj
∂αi
∣∣∣
|0〉
, so the above becomes
(3.3) |α˙〉 = D|α〉.
Any scaling of r is an equilibrium, so
(3.4) |0〉 = D|1〉.
3.2. Results. It is very familiar in dynamical systems that the controlling parameter in dynamics
of the form Eq. (3.3) is the maximum real part of any eigenvalue of D; the system is unstable if the
maximum is positive. As we will see below, the eigenvalues of our operator D are real, and so may
be indexed λ↓1(D) ≥ . . . ≥ λ↓n(D). As we see from Eq. (3.4), however, one of these eigenvalues
is 0. This particular eigenvalue is irrelevant to our considerations: it merely expresses that the
problem is scale-invariant in the prices, and so equilibrium prices form a ray. We will express this
in the dynamics by writing α(t) for the price vector perturbation at time t, and decomposing this
into a part proportional to |1〉 which is unchanging, and a remainder, as follows: α(t) = |c〉+ α¯(t)
for some real c. The key will be to understand the dynamics of α¯(t).
We will also show below that all eigenvalues are nonpositive. Consequently, the quantity of true
interest to us is λ↓2(D). This quantity has the following meaning: there is an invertible matrix B
(to be introduced below) such that, with ‖x‖B :=
√〈x|B†B|x〉,
(i) For all α¯, ‖α¯(t)‖B ≤ ‖α¯(0)‖B · eλ↓2(D)t.
(ii) For some α¯ 6= 0, ‖α¯(t)‖B = ‖α¯(0)‖B · eλ↓2(D)t.
Thus λ↓2(D) can be thought of as the damping rate for perturbations from equilibrium; alter-
natively, − log 2
λ↓2(D)
is the convergence time of the market, the time in which any perturbation from
equilibrium will halve in norm (in a certain preferred basis).
Before giving the results it is necessary to introduce formally the notion of the Laplacian (or some-
times called the normalized Laplacian) of a weighted graph. A weighted graph is, for this purpose,
a real symmetric matrix A with nonnegative entries, in which no row is 0. Rows and columns are
indexed by vertices of the graph and we say that i ∼ j, i and j are connected by an edge, ifAij > 0.
The Laplacian corresponding to A is the matrixL (A) defined as follows. Define a = σ(A) to be
the diagonal matrix with entries aii > 0 for a2ii =
∑
j Aij . ThenL (A) = I − a−1Aa−1. It is well
known that for any A, 0 = λ↑1(L (A)) ≤ . . . ≤ λ↑n(L (A)) ≤ 2, and that the rank of the kernel
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ofL (A) is the number of connected components of A. Note thatL is homogeneous of degree 0,
i.e., invariant to scaling of its argument.
We will be discussing the Laplacians of several different weighted graphs. The most important,
to be called LC , quantifies exactly the damping rate of the market. The following proposition is
therefore central to the paper.
Proposition 1 (Damping rate characterization). Let
(3.5) q(δ, λ) = −(1 + 2δ)λ+ δλ2.
There is a diagonal matrix B such that
D = B−1 · q(δ, LC) ·B
and therefore the damping rate is λ↓2(D) = λ↓2(q(δ, LC)).
It should be said however that LC has a rather complicated dependence on C; and that C itself may
be hard to know precisely. We will therefore devote attention to obtaining plainer bounds.
There is one very special case however in which LC is easy to write down: the “uniform” case,
in which all coefficients Cij are either 0 or 1 and every participant has the same “degree”, that is,
there is an integer ∆ > 1 s.t. for all i, |{j : Cij = 1}| = |{j : Cji = 1}| = ∆. In this case (a)
equilibrium prices are uniform, (b) LC = L (U). The calculations in this case are simpler than in
general and allow for the following statement.
Theorem 2 (Bounds for uniform markets). In the special case just defined,
(3.6) q(δ, λ↑2(L (U))) ≤ λ↓2(D) ≤ max{q(δ, λ↑2(L (U))),−2}
with the lower bound being tight if δ ≤ 1/2 or in other cases discussed in Section 6.2.
The general case is given in Theorem 3: it is a strict generalization of Theorem 2, given in terms
of the aforementioned Laplacian LC , whose definition will be given in Section 5.
Theorem 3 (Bounds for more general markets). q(δ, λ↑2(LC)) ≤ λ↓2(D) ≤ max{q(δ, λ↑2(LC)),−2}.
As noted above, LC is not easy to read off from the market data C. For this reason, we follow
Theorem 3 with “comparison theorems” in which we provide weaker bounds in terms of more
easily-obtained quantities. The main tool here is a lemma in spectral graph theory which ought to
be known, but which we have not been able to find previously proven. First, a definition:
For two n×nweighted adjacency matricesW, W˜ , let ν = ν(W, W˜ ) =
(
maxi,j
Wij
W˜ij
)
·
(
maxi,j
W˜ij
Wij
)
,
with the ratios taken as 1 when numerator and denominator are 0. (Thus ν ≥ 1, with ν = 1 only if
W, W˜ are scale copies of the same matrix.)
Lemma 4 (Laplacian stability). λ↑2(L (W˜ )) ≤ ν(W, W˜ )·λ↑2(L (W )). This bound is best possible
for all ν.
(In this lemma W may be any weighted adjacency matrix, not necessarily our market graph, al-
though that is how we apply the lemma.)
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Proof. We may assume that W is connected, otherwise apply the lemma separately to each con-
nected component.
Note that there is always a c > 0 s.t. Wij ≤ ν1/2cW˜ij ≤ νWij for all i, j (and this serves as an
alternative definition of ν). Recalling that L is invariant under rescaling of its argument, we may
assume that W˜ has been scaled so that Wij ≤ ν1/2W˜ij ≤ νWij for all i, j.
Let w = σ(W ) and w˜ = σ(W˜ ). Let L = L (W ) and L˜ = L (W˜ ).
It is well known that kerL = span |w〉. Likewise ker L˜ = span |w˜〉. By the spectral theorem,
λ↑2(L) = inf
x:〈x||w〉=0
〈x|L|x〉
〈x||x〉
and applying the transformation |b〉 = w−1|x〉 we have
(3.7) λ↑2(L) = inf
b:〈b||w2〉=0
〈b|wLw|b〉
〈b|w2|b〉
Note that
〈b|wLw|b〉
〈b|w2|b〉 =
∑
i<jWij(bi − bj)2∑
iw
2
i b
2
i
=: RW (b)
RW (b) is known as the Raleigh quotient of b in W .
Let b be a vector achieving Eq. (3.7), that is to say, a second eigenvector of L. So 〈b||w2〉 = 0 and
λ↑2(L) =
〈b|wLw|b〉
〈b|w2|b〉 .
We use b to produce a proxy bˆ for a second eigenvector of L˜:
|bˆ〉 = |b〉 − |1〉〈w˜
2||b〉
〈w˜||1〉
This satisfies the required
〈w˜2||bˆ〉 = 0.
So
λ↑2(L˜) ≤ RW˜ (bˆ) =
∑
i<j W˜ij(bˆi − bˆj)2∑
i w˜
2
i bˆ
2
i
=
∑
i<j W˜ij(bi − bj)2∑
i w˜
2
i bˆ
2
i
Upper bounding the entries of W˜ , we have
. . . ≤ ν1/2
∑
i<jWij(bi − bj)2∑
i w˜
2
i bˆ
2
i
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and lower bounding the entries of w˜, we have
. . . ≤ ν
∑
i<jWij(bi − bj)2∑
iw
2
i bˆ
2
i
= ν
∑
i<jWij(bi − bj)2∑
iw
2
i b
2
i
∑
iw
2
i b
2
i∑
iw
2
i bˆ
2
i
= νRW (b)
∑
iw
2
i b
2
i∑
iw
2
i bˆ
2
i
= νλ↑2(L)
∑
iw
2
i b
2
i∑
iw
2
i bˆ
2
i
We need to lower bound the last denominator. Recall that there is a t s.t. bˆi = bi − t. Let f(t) =∑
iw
2
i (bi−t)2. Then f is a quadratic in twith positive leading coefficient, and ∂f/∂t = 2t
∑
iw
2
i−
2
∑
iw
2
i bi = 2t
∑
iw
2
i ; so f achieves its global minimum at t = 0. Consequently,
∑
i w
2
i b
2
i∑
i w
2
i bˆ
2
i
≤ 1 and
therefore
λ↑2(L˜) ≤ νλ↑2(L)
proving the bound in the Lemma.
Turning to optimality of the Lemma: an example achieving this must focus the “w” weight away
from the “b” weight, so that large jumps in b occur only across weakly-weighted edges. This is
achieved in the example of a chainW of three edges in which the middle edge has weight 1 and the
outside edges weight x. One may calculate that λ↑2(L (W )) = 11+x . Now consider W˜ in which
the outside edges have weight x/ν. Then λ↑2(L (W˜ ))/λ↑2(L (W )) = ν 1+xν+x . Fixing any ν and
considering the limit of large x we see that the supremum of this ratio is ν. 
In order to apply the lemma we need to bound ν; this will depend on two basic parameters. These
are γ, a kind of measure of the complexity of the utility functions; and ψ˜, which measures the
disparity in the equilibrium prices across the network. The first part of the comparison theorem
assumes knowledge only of the underlying network (encapsulated in U ), and of the numbers γ
and ψ˜. The second part of the comparison theorem assumes that besides the network and γ, we
know also the equilibrium prices. This is reasonable if one is studying a functioning market near
equilibrium. Let E denote the weighted adjacency matrix with weights Eij =
√
rirj on edges
i ∼ j of the network (and 0 elsewhere).
Theorem 5 (Market comparison bounds).
(1) Bound through the unweighted Laplacian:
q(δ,min{ψ˜γ2+δλ↑2(L (U)), 1 + 1
2δ
, 1 +
1
n− 1}) ≤ λ↓2(D)
≤ max{q(δ, λ↑2(L (U))/(ψ˜γ2+δ)),−2}.
(2) Bound through the equilibrium prices Laplacian:
q(δ,min{γ1+δλ↑2(L (E)), 1 + 1
2δ
, 1 +
1
n− 1}) ≤ λ↓2(D)
≤ max{q(δ, λ↑2(L (E))/γ1+δ),−2}.
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The complicated form of these bounds is misleading; in many and perhaps most cases of interest,
the min or max is achieved by the term containing λ↑2, hence the slack is fully captured by the
factor of ψ˜γ2+δ or γ1+δ respectively. Exceptions are briefly discussed after Lemma 15.
Finally, we remind that the damping rate of a market is important not for what it says about (nonex-
istent) markets that are in true isolation; but rather for what it says about the predictive power of
the equilibrium model, to a market that is buffeted by external noise. This is taken up in Section 8,
where we show that in a certain noise model, and for any family of markets in which the prices are
within a bounded range:
Theorem 6 (Steady state distribution). In steady state the prices are distributed according to a
multivariate normal distribution, with largest directional variance proportional to −1/λ↓2(D).
4. EQUILIBRIUM: EXISTENCE, UNIQUENESS AND DETAILED BALANCE
The equilibrium equations Eq. (2.2) are homogeneous of degree 1 in r, so any scalar multiple of an
equilibrium vector r is also an equilibrium vector. Subsequently when we discuss uniqueness, “up
to scaling” is implied. Due to connectedness of the market, no price can be 0 at an equilibrium. The
existence of an equilibrium in our setting is a corollary of the theorem of Arrow and Debreu [5]
and McKenzie [32] (improving on an earlier argument of Wald, see [25, 16]). In fact, as the utility
functions are strongly concave and twice continuously differentiable, the equilibrium is unique
(up to price scaling). We, however, require special properties of the equilibrium, and so need an
existence proof which establishes these properties. In the course of providing this we incidentally
give a self-contained proof of existence and uniqueness.
Adopting a term from probability theory, we say that a market is in detailed balance at prices r if
for every i, j, the payments from i to j equal those from j to i. The payment from i to j is dijrj so
the detailed balance conditions are riCij
rδjRi
=
rjCji
rδiRj
, or
(4.1)
r1+δi Cij
Ri
=
r1+δj Cji
Rj
Theorem 7. A market C has unique equilibrium prices r, and this market is in detailed balance at
prices r.
We remind that this is in the regime δ > 0, among the other assumptions detailed in Section 2.
Proof. We begin with uniqueness.
Lemma 8. There can be at most one equilibrium vector.
Proof. Suppose there are two vectors r, r′ solving the equilibrium equations Eq. (2.2), with j a
vertex minimizing r′j/rj and having a neighbor i (that is, an i s.t.Cij > 0) which does not minimize
this ratio. Rescale r′ so r′j = rj , r
′
i ≥ ri for all i, and r′i > ri for some neighbor i of j. Observe
that since δ > 0, the quantity ri/Ri is a nondecreasing function of the price vector r, and moreover
strictly increasing in ri and in any rk for k a neighbor of i. Then applying Eq. (2.2) in numerator
and denominator:
1 =
r′1+δj
r1+δj
=
∑
i
r′iCij
R′i∑
i
riCij
Ri
>
∑
i
riCij
Ri∑
i
riCij
Ri
= 1
a contradiction. 
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Lemma 9. There exist prices r satisfying the detailed balance conditions Eq. (4.1).
Proof. Define for every two vertices i, j the value
ψi,j =
k∏
`=1
Ci`−1i`
Ci`i`−1
,
where i = i0, i1, . . . , ik = j is a path in the graph; we claim this is well defined. Consider another
path i = i0, i′1, . . . , i
′
k′ = j and form the cycle i0, i1, . . . , ik−1, j, i
′
k′−1, . . . , i
′
1, i0. The claim follows
by the circulation-free property of c. Consequently we can fix i0 to be a vertex such that ψi0,j ≥ 1
for all j, and define
(4.2) ψj = ψi0,j
(with ψi0 = 1). For future reference, observe that ψ satisfies for any edge i ∼ j the identity
(4.3) ψiCij = ψjCji
and that Eq. (4.1) yields by telescoping product another expression for ψ:
(4.4) ψj =
r1+δj Ri0
r1+δi0 Rj
.
For use now and below we make several definitions:
(1) ψ˜ = maxj ψj = (maxj ψj)/(minj ψj). This is a global measure of the disparity of prices
in the network, and may of course be interpreted as a measure of the disparity of the
desirability of the various goods.
(2) γ = maxi
∑
j Cij . This is a local measure of the diversity within each utility function.
(Recall that each nonzero Cij is at least 1.)
(3) For p a price vector, pmax = maxj pj , pmin = minj pj , and p˜ = pmax/pmin. Let | · | denote
geometric mean, so |p| = ∏n1 p1/ni .
Continuing with the proof, let K = {p : |p| = 1, p˜ ≤ γψ˜}. Let f 0 : K → Rn,
f 0j (p) = |p|
1+2δ
1+δ (ψjPj(p))
1
1+δ .
Let f : K → Rn, fj(p) = f 0j (p)/|f 0(p)|. By Eq. (4.3), a fixed point of f is a solution of Eq. (4.1).
We now show that f maps K into K. By construction, |f(p)| = 1; what we have to show is that
f˜(p) ≤ γψ˜. This is equivalent to showing that f˜ 0(p) ≤ γψ˜. We have
f 0j (p) ≤ |p|
1+2δ
1+δ
(
ψmaxγ
pδmin
) 1
1+δ
f 0j (p) ≥ |p|
1+2δ
1+δ
(
ψmin
pδmax
) 1
1+δ
so for p ∈ K,
f˜ 0(p) ≤
(
ψ˜γp˜δ
) 1
1+δ ≤
(
ψ˜γ(γψ˜)δ
) 1
1+δ
= γψ˜.
Thus in fact f : K → K. Since K is compact and convex and f is continuous on K, the Brouwer
fixed point theorem ensures f has a fixed point in K. 
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Finally, we compute, using the demand functions Eq. (2.1), the total demand at j for detailed-
balance prices r
(4.5)
∑
i
dij =
1
r1+δj
∑
i
riCij
Ri
=
1
r1+δj
∑
i
r1+δj Cji
rδiRj
=
1
Rj
∑
i
Cji
rδi
= 1
where in the second equality we have applied the detailed balance conditions Eq. (4.1).
This shows that prices r satisfying detailed balance necessarily satisfy the equilibrium conditions
Eq. (2.2).
By Lemmas 8, 9 the Arrow-Debreu market possesses a solution which is unique and which more-
over satisfies detailed balance. 
The above arguments imply in particular that in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, any two prices are
within a factor of γψ˜.
5. QUADRATIC EXPANSION OF THE DYNAMICS IN TERMS OF LOCAL INTERACTIONS
We now proceed to calculate D, the kernel of the dynamics, given by Eq. (3.3):
|α˙j〉 = Dji|αi〉.
In order to state the outcome of this calculation it is necessary to define three matrices: First, the
(symmetric) matrix ` with entries
(5.1) `ji =
√
CijCji
RirδiRjr
δ
j
.
and its “complement” LC = I − `.
Next, the diagonal matrix B with entries
(5.2) Bjj =
r
1+δ/2
j
R
1/2
j ψ
1/2
j
.
Key to our work is that LC contains all information necessary to express the system dynamics;
this is encapsulated in Proposition 1, which as we recall states that BDB−1 = q(δ, LC), where
q(δ, λ) = −(1 + 2δ)λ + δλ2, as given in Eq. (3.5). The rest of this section is devoted to proving
Proposition 1.
Proof. The starting point for the calculation is Eq. (2.1). We consider the diagonal and off-diagonal
entries of D separately.
Lemma 10. The entries Djj are:
Djj =
Cjj
Rjrδj
− (1 + δ) +
∑
i
δCijCji
RirδiRjr
δ
j
And consequently
Djj = −1− δ + `jj + δ
∑
i
`2ji.
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Proof.
Djj =
∑
i
(
∂dij
∂αj
)∣∣∣∣
|0〉
=
∑
i
∂
∂αj
∣∣∣∣
|0〉
piCij
p1+δj
∑
k Cik/p
δ
k
=
∂
∂αj
∣∣∣∣
|0〉
[
pjCjj
p1+δj
∑
k Cjk/p
δ
k
+
∑
i 6=j
piCij
p1+δj
∑
k Cik/p
δ
k
]
=
∂
∂αj
∣∣∣∣
|0〉
[
e−δαjCjj
Cjje−δαj + rδj
∑
k 6=j Cjk/r
δ
k
+
∑
i 6=j
riCij
rjeαjCij + r
1+δ
j e
(1+δ)αj
∑
k 6=j Cik/r
δ
k
]
=
−δrδjRjCjj + δC2jj
r2δj R
2
j
+
∑
i 6=j
−riCij(−δrjCij + (1 + δ)r1+δj Ri)
r2+2δj R
2
i
=
δC2jj
r2δj R
2
j
− δCjj
rδjRj
+
∑
i 6=j
1
Ri
ri
(
δrjC
2
ij
r2+2δj Ri
− (1 + δ)Cij
r1+δj
)
We replace the factor 1
Ri
inside the last summation by a term depending on Rj using Eq. (4.1)
which gives Ri =
r1+δi CijRj
r1+δj Cji
. So
Djj =
δC2jj
r2δj R
2
j
− δCjj
rδjRj
+
∑
i 6=j
ri
(
δrjC
2
ijr
1+δ
j Cji
r2+2δj Rir
1+δ
i CijRj
− (1 + δ)Cijr
1+δ
j Cji
r1+δj r
1+δ
i CijRj
)
=
δC2jj
r2δj R
2
j
− δCjj
rδjRj
+
∑
i 6=j
(
δCijCji
rδjRir
δ
iRj
− (1 + δ)Cji
Rjrδi
)
=
Cjj
Rjrδj
−
∑
i
(1 + δ)Cji
Rjrδi
+
∑
i
δCijCji
RirδiRjr
δ
j
=
Cjj
Rjrδj
− (1 + δ) +
∑
i
δCijCji
RirδiRjr
δ
j

Lemma 11. The entries Djk, k 6= j are:
Djk =
rkCkj
r1+δj Rk
+
δr1−δk CkkCkj
r1+δj R
2
k
+
∑
i 6=k
δriCijCik
rδkr
1+δ
j R
2
i
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Proof.
Djk =
∑
i
(
∂dij
∂αk
)∣∣∣∣
|0〉
=
∑
i
∂
∂αk
∣∣∣∣
|0〉
piCij
p1+δj
∑
hCih/p
δ
h
=
∂
∂αk
∣∣∣∣
|0〉
[
pkCkj
p1+δj
∑
hCkh/p
δ
h
+
∑
i 6=k
piCij
p1+δj
∑
hCih/p
δ
h
]
=
∂
∂αk
∣∣∣∣
|0〉
[
rke
αkCkj
r1+δj (Ckke
−δαk/rδk +
∑
h6=k Ckh/r
δ
h)
+
∑
i 6=k
riCij
r1+δj (Cike
−δαk/rδk +
∑
h6=k Cih/r
δ
h)
]
=
(r1+δj Rk + δr
1+δ
j Ckk/r
δ
k)rkCkj
r2+2δj R
2
k
+
∑
i 6=k
δriCijr
1+δ
j Cik/r
δ
k
r2+2δj R
2
i
=
rkCkj
r1+δj Rk
+
δr1−δk CkkCkj
r1+δj R
2
k
+
∑
i 6=k
δriCijCik
rδkr
1+δ
j R
2
i

The dynamics matrix D is not symmetric but we can symmetrize it by the change of basis |β〉 =
B|α〉. So we study the dynamics on β obtained by similarity transform:
(5.3) |β˙〉 = BDB−1|β〉
Now
(BDB−1)jk =
√
Rkψkr
2+δ
j
Rjψjr
2+δ
k
(
rkCkj
r1+δj Rk
+
δr1−δk CkkCkj
r1+δj R
2
k
+
∑
i 6=k
1
Ri
δriCijCik
rδkr
1+δ
j Ri
)
We replace the factor 1
Ri
inside the last summation by a term depending on Rk using Eq. (4.1),
yielding
(BDB−1)jk =
√
Rkψkr
2+δ
j
Rjψjr
2+δ
k
(
rkCkj
r1+δj Rk
+
δr1−δk CkkCkj
r1+δj R
2
k
+
∑
i 6=k
δCijrkCki
r1+δj Rir
δ
iRk
)
=
√
Rkψkr
2+δ
j
Rjψjr
2+δ
k
rkCkj
r1+δj Rk
+
√
Rkψkr
2+δ
j
Rjψjr
2+δ
k
δr1−δk CkkCkj
r1+δj R
2
k
+
∑
i 6=k
√
ψk
RjRkψjrδkr
δ
j
δCijCki
Rirδi
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Apply the identity Eq. (4.3) to the edges j ∼ k in the first two terms, and i ∼ j and i ∼ k in the
third term.
(BDB−1)jk =
√
CjkCkj
RjrδjRkr
δ
k
+
√
δCkjCjk
RjrδjRkr
δ
k
√
δC2kk
R2kr
2δ
k
+
∑
i 6=k
√
δCijCji
RirδiRjr
δ
j
√
δCkiCik
RirδiRkr
δ
k
=
√
CjkCkj
RjrδjRkr
δ
k
+
∑
i
√
δCijCji
RirδiRjr
δ
j
√
δCkiCik
RirδiRkr
δ
k
= `jk + δ
∑
i
`ji`ik
The quadratic expansion formula. Collecting the calculations of Djj and Djk, we have:
(BDB−1)jk =
{
−1− δ + `jj + δ
∑
i `
2
ji if j = k
`jk + δ
∑
i `ji`ik if j 6= k
Finally, we can complete the proof of Proposition 1: −(1+2δ)LC +δLC2 = −(1+δ)I+`+δ`2 =
BDB−1. 
6. THE DYNAMICS IN TERMS OF THE MARKET LAPLACIAN LC
In general terms Proposition 1 gives what we have been seeking: an expression for the system
dynamics, in terms of a symmetric matrix whose off-diagonal entries are supported on the edges of
the network. In order to make this more quantitative we start by fulfilling our earlier promise and
showing how LC may be represented as the Laplacian LC = L (W ) of a suitable edge-weighting
W of the network. As described earlier, this requires that LC = I − w−1Ww−1, equivalently
` = w−1Ww−1
where w = σ(W ). It will simplify notation to write wi = wii.
Now equivalently, with |wi〉 = w|1〉 denoting the vector containing the diagonal entries of w,
w2i =
∑
j
wi`ijwj
|wi〉 = `|wi〉.
So we wish to identify the kernel of I − ` = LC . We show that this kernel equals B|1〉. First, in
order to verify that B|1〉 is in the kernel, we obtain from Eqs. (5.2) and (4.4) that for all k,
(6.1) Bkk =
√
rkr
1+δ
i0
Ri0
(where i0 is any fixed vertex as defined in Lemma 9). Now
(LCB|1〉)j =
√
r1+δi0
Ri0
∑
k
√
rkLCjk =
√
r1+δi0
Ri0
(
√
rj −
∑
k
√
rk`jk
)
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If we combine Eqs (4.1) and (5.1) we see that `jk =
Cjk
√
rj
Rj
√
r1+2δk
. Substituting, we have
(LCB|1〉)j =
√
r1+δi0
Ri0
√
rj(1− 1
Rj
∑
k
Cjk
rδk
) = 0
as required.
Thus we have that wi = Bii, which is to say w = B; and that the matrix W formed by
(6.2) W = B`B
is the weighted adjacency matrix corresponding to the Laplacian LC . Since all Bii are positive and
the nonzero off-diagonal entries of LC form a connected graph, the kernel of LC is of rank 1, and
all remaining eigenvalues of LC are positive. As is well known, all are bounded above by 2.
6.1. The corresponding random walk. Although not strictly required for our work, we pause to
describe the random walk which corresponds to the undirected edge-weighted graph W . Acting as
r.w. on column vectors, it is the stochastic matrix obtained by rescaling each column i of W by w2i ,
equivalently B2ii, namely WB
−2. This in turn can be rewritten as B`B−1. One may readily verify
that 〈1| is invariant:
〈1|B`B−1 = 〈1|WB−2 = 〈B2ii|B−2 = 〈1|
and the corresponding right eigenvector, the stationary distribution, is |B2ii〉:
B`B−1|B2ii〉 = WB−2|B2ii〉 = W |1〉 = |B2ii〉.
Our detailed balance condition agrees here with the detailed balance condition of the random walk,
namely that for any i ∼ j, the frequency of transitions in each direction across the edge are equal,
which we can verify here by:
(WB−2)jiB2ii = Wji = Wij = (WB
−2)ijB2jj
6.2. Proof of Theorem 3: bounds on λ↓2(BDB−1) in terms of λ↑2(LC). Ultimately what we
are interested in is the second-largest eigenvalue ofBDB−1 (the largest being 0 and corresponding
to the ray of equilibrium states), denoted λ↓2(BDB−1), which we called earlier the damping rate
of the market, because it scales as −1/T for T the half-life of a perturbation from equilibrium. (It
is convenient that the eigenvalues are real, but of course the familiar property of linear systems that
we are exploiting and quantifying here is that the eigenvalues are in the open left-half plane.)
Due to Proposition 1 every eigenvalue λ of LC maps to an eigenvalue q(δ, λ) = −(1 + 2δ)λ+ δλ2
of BDB−1. The mapping q is monotone decreasing in λ throughout [0, 1 + 1
2δ
]; if 1 + 1
2δ
< 2 it
then rises, symmetrically, to −2 at λ = 2, and it also equals −2 at 1
δ
. (See Figure.) Thus, sufficient
conditions that λ↓2(BDB−1) = q(δ, λ↑2(LC)) include that (a) The spectrum of LC is contained in
[0, 1 + 1
2δ
], or (b) λ↑2(LC) ≤ 1δ .
Clause (a) will occur if W is “far from bipartite”, in particular if there is sufficient local consump-
tion of goods (i.e., the coefficients Cjj are large enough). Clause (b) is in particular guaranteed if
δ ≤ 1/2.
Even outside these favorable cases, note that for any λ > 1 + 1
2δ
, q(δ, λ) ≤ −2. Consequently in
all cases:
(6.3) q(δ, λ↑2(LC)) ≤ λ↓2(BDB−1) ≤ max{q(δ, λ↑2(LC)),−2}
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This proves Theorem 3.
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6.3. Proof of Theorem 2: the “uniform” special case. Earlier we referred to the special case
that all Cij ∈ {0, 1} and there is a ∆ > 1 s.t. for all i, |{j : Cij = 1}| = |{j : Cji = 1}| = ∆. In
this case all ri = 1, B is the identity, ` = W , and Wij = 0 unless i ∼ j in which case Wij = 1/∆.
Then LC = L (U). So Eq. (6.3) proves Theorem 2.
7. COMPARISON THEOREMS: THE MARKET LAPLACIAN LC VS. THE UNWEIGHTED
LAPLACIAN L (U) AND THE EQUILIBRIUM PRICES LAPLACIAN L (E).
We have been working so far with a Laplacian LC which carries very detailed information about
the parameters C of the market, and moreover, depends on those parameters in an indirect way
(through the equilibrium prices). Generally however, when studying a market, we may not know
C or LC ; and things will certainly not be as simple as in Theorem 2. One of our goals is to have
(still two-sided) bounds on the convergence time which are weaker than Theorem 3 but require
less edge-by-edge information: only the connectivity structure of the market (i.e., the matrix U
of the unweighted network)—which is revealed from actual consumption—and, optionally, the
equilibrium prices. The key to this is Lemma 4, which will enable us in this Section to bound
λ↓2(BDB−1) in terms of the unweighted network Laplacian L (U) or the equilibrium prices
LaplacianL (E).
In both results we pay an approximation factor polynomial in the “utility function complexity” γ; in
the former result, we also pay a factor proportional to the “price disparity” ψ˜ (both parameters were
defined in Section 4). Both these dependences are necessary, as we discuss in the next Section.
First we exhibit that ψ˜ can be exponential in the network size even though γ is constant. It is
therefore advantageous, in applying these results, to know the equilibrium prices.
Example 12. Take δ = 1. Fix any a > 1 and create a market among participants 1, . . . , n arranged
in a chain, as follows. Cij is nonzero only for |i − j| ≤ 1. For such i, j, Cij = aj−i. Up to some
edge-effects, prices in this network are proportional to a2i. Thus ψ˜ ∈ Θ(a2n).
Before proving Theorem 5 we first establish two lemmas about the equilibrium prices:
Lemma 13. maxi∼j rirj ≤ γ.
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Proof. Let i ∼ j be such that µ = ri
rj
= maxi′∼j′
ri′
rj′
. Applying Eq. (4.1):
µ1+δ =
r1+δi
r1+δj
=
CjiRi
CijRj
=
Cji
∑
k Cik/r
δ
k
Cij
∑
`Cj`/r
δ
`
≤
(
µ2rj
ri
)δ
Cji
∑
k Cik
Cij
∑
`Cj`
= µδ
Cji
∑
k Cik
Cij
∑
`Cj`
and applying Cji ≤
∑
`Cj`, the lemma follows. 
Lemma 14. For any i ∼ j, γ−2−2δ ≤ CijCji
rδiRir
δ
jRj
≤ 1. That is, γ−1−δ ≤ `ij ≤ 1.
Proof. The upper bound follows by dropping most terms in the denominator, leaving only rδi
Cij
rδj
rδj
Cji
rδi
.
For the lower bound we apply Lemma 13 to get Ri ≤ (γ/ri)δ
∑
k Cik. Applying the same to Rj
yields CijCji
rδiRir
δ
jRj
≥ CijCji
γ2δ(
∑
k Cik)(
∑
` Cj`)
≥ γ−2−2δ. 
As D and BDB−1 are cospectral, all bounds from now on are stated in terms of the latter which,
being symmetric, is easier to work with. So we proceed with the proof of Theorem 5, replacing
λ↓2(D) in it with λ↓2(BDB−1).
Proof. The proof breaks into two lemmas. The first is a general bound on the damping rate of
our market (with adjacency matrix W and Laplacian LC = L (W )), in terms of two features of
any other adjacency matrix W ′: the spectrum of its Laplacian, and ν(W,W ′). The second lemma
bounds ν(W,U) and ν(W,E).
Lemma 15. Let ν = ν(W,W ′). Then
q(δ,min{νλ↑2(L (W ′)), 1 + 1
2δ
, 1 +
1
n− 1}) ≤ λ↓2(BDB
−1)
≤ max{q(δ, λ↑2(L (W ′))/ν),−2}.
Proof. For the first inequality in the Lemma, recall λ↓2(BDB−1) ≥ q(δ, λ↑2(LC)) from Eq. (6.3);
also note that q(δ, λ) is monotone decreasing in λ until the global minimum at 1 + 1
2δ
. We have
two upper bounds on λ↑2(LC): λ↑2(LC) ≤ νλ↑2(L (W ′)) from Lemma 4, and λ↑2(LC) ≤ 1 + 1n−1
because Tr(LC) ≤ n. Consequently λ↓2(BDB−1) ≥ q(δ,min{νλ↑2(L (W ′)), 1 + 12δ , 1 + 1n−1}).
For the second inequality, recall λ↓2(BDB−1) ≤ max{q(δ, λ↑2(LC)),−2} from Eq. (6.3). If
λ↓2(BDB−1) > −2 then necessarily q(δ, λ↑2(LC)) > −2, and then we must have λ↑2(LC) <
min{1/δ, 2}. This implies q is monotone in the interval [0, λ↑2(LC)]; then applying λ↑2(L (W ′))/ν ≤
λ↑2(LC) from Lemma 4, we find q(δ, λ↑2(LC)) ≤ q(δ, λ↑2(L (W ′))/ν). 
Remark 16. An equivalent form of the upper bound in Lemma 15 is
max{q(δ, λ↑2(L (W ′))/ν),−2} = q(δ,min{λ↑2(L (W ′))/ν, 1/δ}).
Remark 17. In most cases of interest the bounds in Lemma 15 are determined by the λ↑2(L (W ′))
term. For δ ≤ 1/2 q is monotone in [0, 2], so this is guaranteed. Even outside this range “most”
graphs will have λ↑2(L (W ′)) small enough for this to hold (unless ν is very large; but then the
comparison theorem is of course rather weak to begin with). Nevertheless it is worth pointing out
an example, even with ν = 1, when the bound is not determined by λ↑2(L (W ′)). Take the com-
plete bipartite graphK2,2. Its Laplacian spectrum is {0, 1, 1, 2}. For δ > 1/2 the critical eigenvalue
here is not λ↑2(L (K2,2)) = 1, but λ↑4(L (K2,2)) = 2, and correspondingly the damping rate is
−2.
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Lemma 18. ν(W,U) ≤ ψ˜γ2+δ and ν(W,E) ≤ γ1+δ.
Proof. Consider the entries of the weighted adjacency matrix, W = B`B. Applying Lemma 14
and Eq. (6.1),
(7.1)
r1+δi0
Ri0
√
rirjγ
−1−δ ≤ Wij ≤
r1+δi0
Ri0
√
rirj
Earlier (Section 4) we bounded the variation in prices in terms of γψ˜, and so we have that if
Wij 6= 0 then for any i′, j′: Wi′j′/Wij ≤ ψ˜γ2+δ. This implies the first bound in the lemma. The
second bound in the lemma follows immediately from Eq. (7.1). 
This completes the proof of Theorem 5. 
Remark 19 (on the necessity of the dependences on γ and ψ˜ in Theorem 5). First, concerning γ: it is
clear that the bounds in Theorem 5 must depend on γ because very “weak” edges, those expressing
little interest of participant i in good j, are in the unweighted graph indistinguishable from any
other edge; their presence must therefore weaken the quality of the result that we can obtain from
knowing only the unweighted graph. Weak edges express themselves in our parameters by forcing
γ to be large.
Next, concerning ψ˜: the main difference in the strengths of Part (1) and Part (2) is that in the latter
we do not lose the factor of ψ˜ due to the disparity in prices. One might ask whether the factor of
ψ˜ in the bound is an artifact of the analysis. The answer is that it is not: the dependence on ψ˜ in
Part (1) is unavoidable. In markets with very unbalanced prices, even if γ is bounded, the Laplacian
L (U) of the unweighted graph can be an exponentially poor proxy for the actual market Laplacian
LC . We now show this.
Example showing exponential gap in damping rate between LC and L (U). Our example uses
δ = 1. Fix any A > 1 and create a market among participants −n, . . . , n arranged in a chain, so
that Cij > 0 if and only if |i − j| ≤ 1. We will show how to set the coefficients Cij in a bounded
range so that ri = A|i|. We describe the Cij’s for i ≥ 0; the construction will be symmetric about
the origin.
Then Eq. (4.1) is, first at 0, then at 0 < i < n, and then at n:
C01
1 + 2C01A−1
=
A2C10
C10 + A−1 + C12A−2
(7.2)
Ci,i+1A
2i
A1−iCi,i−1 + A−i + Ci,i+1A−i−1
=
A2i+2Ci+1,i
A−iCi+1,i + A−i−1 + Ci+1,i+2A−i−2
(7.3)
Cn−1,nA2n−2
A2−nCn−1,n−2 + A−n+1 + Cn−1,nA−n
=
A2nCn,n−1
A−n+1Cn,n−1 + A−n
(7.4)
Next specialize to taking all Ci,i+1 = A. Then Eq. (7.3) becomes
A2i+1
A1−iCi,i−1 + 2A−i
=
A2i+2Ci+1,i
A−iCi+1,i + 2A−i−1
It turns out that Ci+1,i converges rapidly to A−2 which we can see from writing Ci,i−1 = A−2 +αi,
Ci+1,i = A
−2 + αi+1, and deriving the recurrence αi+1 = g(αi) where
g(x) :=
−x
A2 + 2A
THE INVISIBLE HAND OF LAPLACE 19
maps the interval (−1/A2, 1) into itself.
It remains only to show that the boundary conditions can be satisfied consistent with these choices.
In Eq. (7.2), which becomes A/3 = A2C10/(C10 + 2/A), we have C10 = 23A2−A , which lies in
the interval (−1/A2, 1) for any A > 1. It remains only to see that there is a positive solution to
Eq. (7.4), which becomes An−1/(A3−n + 2A1−n) = AnCn,n−1/(A1−nCn,n−1 +A−n) and is solved
by Cn,n−1 = 1A4+2A2−A which is indeed bounded away from 0.
Now that we have such a simple representation for the equilibrium prices, we can examine the
weighted graph. Note that all nonzero entries of ` are within a constant factor (depending on A) of
1. From Eqs. (6.1) (with i0 = 0) and (6.2) we see that Ri0 = 3, Bkk =
√
A|k|/3, and the weight
of edge i ∼ i + 1 is within a constant factor of A|i|+1/2. Therefore, splitting this graph about the
origin, we see that its conductance is proportional to A−n. From the Cheeger inequalities [2, 1, 42]
we can conclude that the algebraic connectivity, too, is exponentially small in n. The algebraic
connectivity of the unweighted chain, by contrast, is proportional to 1/n2.
Thus, in this market, price equilibration is exponentially slower than that of a market that has the
same connectivity structure but in which all goods have the same price.
8. MARKETS SUBJECT TO NOISE
The obvious implication of the damping rate is that it tells how quickly an isolated market that has
been disrupted, will converge back to equilibrium. But a more interesting implication concerns
markets which are not isolated, but instead can be modeled as continually disturbed by noise. In
this case, as we now show, the damping rate, rather than telling us something about the dynamics
of the market, tells us instead about its steady state—which is no longer a single equilibrium point,
but a probability distribution over the price space.
We do not attempt a “realistic” treatment of noise. We analyze a noise model chosen for analytic
convenience and speculate that the qualitative predictions will hold for other light-tailed noise
models. The noise model is additive diffusion in the β basis. That is, |β〉 undergoes a combina-
tion of the deterministic evolution derived in Eq. (5.3), plus a (spherically symmetric) Brownian
motion term. The description of the system at any time is a probability distribution over |β〉. The
deterministic evolution term acts to contract the distribution toward the equilibrium ray of prices;
while the diffusion term acts as an entropic force resisting over-contraction. The combined process
diagonalizes in the basis of eigenvectors of LC , and therefore of D; so we may, for any eigenvector
v of D with eigenvalue λ, replace the deterministic dynamics
x˙ = λx
(in view of Proposition 1 this is the scalar restriction of the dynamics |β˙〉 = BDB−1|β〉 from
Eq. (5.3), with x being the projection of the current state on the eigenvector v), by stochastic
dynamics on the probability distribution (denoted F ) over x:
(8.1)
∂F (t, x)
∂t
=
κ2
2
∂2
∂2x
F (t, x)− λ ∂
∂x
(xF (t, x))
where κ measures the intensity of the noise.
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Eq. (8.1) is the Fokker-Planck PDE describing the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process [44, 37]. F (x, t)
converges to the Gaussian density √
−λ
piκ2
eλx
2/κ2
Thus the stationary distribution along the v eigenvector is Gaussian about the origin with standard
deviation
√−κ2/2λ. Considering the slowest mode of the system, we have shown Theorem 6.
(The clause bounding prices in the theorem is necessary because the fixed noise rate is being
applied in the β basis and the operator norm of that change of basis is bounded in terms of the
range of prices, as we see from Eq. (6.1).)
Normalizing the noise rate to κ2/2 = 1, we conclude that in a market with damping rate λ, at any
given time the prices are likely to be deviating by about
√−1/λ from their equilibrium values.
Note that, fixing any δ, even for a network in which all Cij are 0 or 1 and every node has only a
constant number of neighbors, −λ may range between a constant (independent of n) and inverse-
quadratic in n. Consequently the quality of connectivity of the market, even in markets of such
limited form, may have an effect as large as linear in the number of agents, upon the size of typical
price deviations from equilibrium.
This confirms and quantifies the expectation that in a rapidly damping (λ 0) market the equilib-
rium solution is highly predictive; while it is less so in a slowly damping (λ only slightly less than
0) market.
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